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The entry of a hard discount supermarket:  
price effects
Andrés Gómez-Lobo *, Juan Luis Jiménez **, Jordi Perdiguero ***
AbstrAct: In this paper we study how an incumbent supermarket reacts when 
entry by a new operator is announced but does not know the product variety that 
the entrant will offer. We use a database obtained from a special survey for su-
permarkets in Gran Canaria to estimate how incumbents reacted to entry in the 
products sold and not sold by the new entrant (LIDL). We show that there is evi-
dence that prices for all goods prior to entry were initially lower in supermarkets 
close to the future entrant compared to supermarkets further away. However, after 
entry incumbents’ prices for products not sold by the entrant actually rose near the 
entrant’s new stores, compared to a suitable control group of supermarkets farther 
away.
JEL classification: L2; L15; L81.
Keywords: Entry; Product Variety; Prices; Retailing.
La entrada de un supermercado de descuento duro: efecto sobre precios
rEsUMEN: En este trabajo analizamos cómo reacciona un incumbente ante la 
entrada de un nuevo operador del que desconoce la variedad de productos que éste 
ofrecerá. Para ello utilizamos una base de datos proveniente de un trabajo de cam-
po propio de supermercados en Gran Canaria en orden a estimar dicha reacción 
en términos de precios, tanto para productos vendidos como no vendidos por el 
entrante (LIDL). Nuestros resultados apuntan a una bajada generalizada de precios 
antes de la entrada por parte de los incumbentes afectados por dicha entrada. Sin 
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embargo, dichos supermercados afectados aumentaron los precios de aquellos pro-
ductos que finalmente no fueron vendidos por el entrante.
clasificación JEL: L2; L15; L81.
Palabras clave: Entrada; variedad de productos; precios; minoristas.
1. Introduction
This paper analyses the pricing effects of entry in the supermarket industry in the 
Gran Canaria Island. One of the curious characteristics of the data is that after entry 
incumbents’ prices for certain products did not fall near the entrant’s new stores, 
compared to a suitable control group of supermarkets farther away. This evidence 
seems to be at odds with the existing empirical literature, which unambiguously indi-
cates that the added competition from a new entrant should decrease prices.
One of the main issues addressed by economic literature are the factors affect-
ing the entry of new competitors (Foster et al., 2006; or Daunfeldt et al., 2010) and 
how barriers to entry may increase equilibrium prices (Griffith and Harmgart, 2008). 
Blinkey and Connor (1998) show how the reduction in market concentration reduces 
prices, especially for perishable products. Aalto-Setälä (2002) states that supermarket 
chains with greater market share have higher mark-ups.
Focusing on the articles that analyze the effects of new entry, most of the liter-
ature analyses the case of the U.S. chain Wal-Mart (Basker, 2005a; Matsa, 2009; 
Zhu and Singh, 2009). The first analysis of this entry effects on prices was Basker 
(2005b), who find a general price reduction. Basker and Noel (2009) found that re-
duction is not homogeneous across all types of operators (majors –0.5%; discount 
stores –1.8%). It should be noted that they show that the prices of products not sold 
by Wal-Mart (movie tickets, hairdressers, etc.) did not change as a consequence of 
entry.
Lira et al (2007) show that prices fell on average between 7 and 11% after entrant 
of new competitor in Chile. Abe and Kawaguchi (2010) provide evidence that the 
opening of new supermarkets in Japan generated significant decreases in prices of 
between 0.4 to 3.1% depending on the product. As far as we are aware, studies exam-
ining the effect of entry on prices are scarce or non-existent for the European market.
Summarizing, all the studies indicate that entry reduces equilibrium prices al-
though in some cases these reductions are quite moderate in magnitude. What is not 
dealt with in the literature is the possible pricing reaction of incumbent’s when the 
announcement of entry in made and there is uncertainty with respect to entrant’s 
product variety and the subsequent pricing strategy once entry is effective and uncer-
tainty is resolved.
Another strand in the literature deals with the degree of competition between dif-
ferent retail formats. For example, Cleeren et al. (2010) using German data analyze 
the degree of intra-format and inter-format competition between hard discount retail-
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ers, such as LIDL and ALDI, and traditional supermarkets. They find that inter-for-
mat competition exists but is less intense than intra-format competition. Interestingly, 
they find that entry of up to two hard discounters does not affect the profits of existing 
supermarkets, although further entry does seem to have an effect.
Following Zhu et al. (2006) they interpret this result as indicating that supermar-
kets can focus on more profitable price-insensitive consumers when a limited amount 
of competition from discounters is present. We find in this paper evidence that incum-
bent supermarkets increase prices for products not sold by the discounter after entry.
The purpose of this article is to document the price effects of LIDL entry in the 
Canary Island supermarket industry after the ‘forced’ deregulation. A first contribu-
tion of this paper is the particular focus placed on analyzing the behavior of prices 
between products sold by the entrant and those products that the new entrant does not 
sell. Our difference in difference estimator of prices entry yields to that prices rise 
for products that the entrant does not sell, while they remain constant for products 
that it does sell. A second contribution of the paper is to show that a 1.5 kilometers 
radius around a supermarket is a reasonable cut-off distance for defining the caption 
area of each store.
After this introduction, section two describes the supermaket industry in Gran 
Canaria and the data used in this study. The results are presented in section three and 
the last section presents the conclusions and recommendatios for further research.
2. The case and the data
Initially, the authorities were unwilling to authorize entry by LIDL even though 
in the municipalities that LIDL wanted to enter the planning regulations were not 
binding. Apparently, the authorities’ opposition was motivated by the negative view 
they had on the opening of hard discount supermarkets, presumably to protect small 
and medium size incumbents. A legal battle ensued and LIDL won, paving the way 
for its entry into those municipalities where planning regulations were not an obsta-
cle. However, in order to placate local sensitivities, LIDL announced that it might 
enter more as a traditional supermarket rather than a hard discount store 1. Thus, for 
incumbents there was uncertainty as to the characteristics and product variety that the 
future entrant would offer.
A special survey was designed and applied in two waves for a representative 
sample of supermarkets in Gran Canaria. The price for 30 category products 2 was 
collected. Note that since the products are the same there are no differences in quality 
1 See «LIDL renuncia al descuento duro», Canarias 7, Sunday, April 2, 2006, page 37, or «LIDL 
entra en Canarias», Monday October 2, 2006, page 14.
2 These products have been included as a representative basket of consumer choices in Spain. The 
products are: rice, cornflakes, spaghetti(*), noodles(*), gofio(*), white bread(*), chicken breast, beef(*), 
ham(*), canned tuna, eggs, milk, yogurt, banana, olive oil (big and small(*)), water, lentils, potatoes, beer, 
cola(*), coffee(*), rum(*), chocolate(*), sugar(*), salt, tooth paste, mop, and detergent(*). The asterisk 
shows those products not sold exactly by LIDL (because it has different size, brand, tipology, etc.).
146 Gómez-Lobo, A., Jiménez, J. L., Perdiguero, J.
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 31 (2015) – Páginas 143 a 154
that may affect the prices set in each supermarket. For some ítems prices for both 
branded and unbranded products were registered.
The first wave was undertaken on the last week of January 2010 (3 weeks before 
LIDL opened) and the second wave on the last week of April 2010 (2 months after 
LIDL opened).
2.1. Sample design
We considered all supermarkets located in areas with at least 15,000 inhabitants 
(688 supermarkets and malls). Stratified random sampling by supermarket size was 
used in the survey design. Almost all supermarkets with more than 1,000 m2 were 
surveyed. However, the percentage of supermarkets analyzed (sample size) is repre-
sentative for all sizes considered.
Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 3 As regards the potential ef-
fects of LIDL, less than 1% of incumbent supermarkets analyzed have a LIDL closer 
than 250 meters. In a 1,500 meters radius, 13% of incumbent supermarkets have a 
LIDL nearby. The proportion of products sold by LIDL is 64% of the total number 
of products.
table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Average S. D. Minimun Maximun
Number of cash registers 5.8 8.3 1 60
Parking 0.4 — 0 1
Unbranded product 0.33 — 0 1
Population at 250 meters 1,271 1,235 2 5,160
Population at 500 meters 4,365 4,088 17 18,438
Population at 1,500 meters 25,774 27,281 744 116,852
Lidl in 250 meters 0.008 0.09 0 1
Lidl in 500 meters 0.03 0.18 0 1
Lidl in 1500 meters 0.13 0.33 0 1
Minimun distance to a Lidl 12,535 8,570 0 28,621
Products sold by Lidl 0.64 — 0 1
Source: Own elaboration. S.D. is Standard Deviation.
3 All distances are Euclidean measures. These have been calculated with Matlab codes, available 
upon request to the authors. Also population figures were obtained assuming a uniform distribution within 
cities. In fact, we used detailed data on smaller agglomerations than cities (núcleos poblacionales in Spa-
nish Statistical nomenclature) by ArcGis software.
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2.2. Descriptive analysis of entry
A quadratic relationship between the logarithm of the change in prices of dif-
ferent products (before and after entry) and distance to a new LIDL store was fitted 
on the data. The results can be seen in Table 2. We have divided the sample into two 
major product groups. On the one hand, there are products seen post-entry to be sold 
by LIDL and on the other, products not sold by this new entrant.
As can be seen, the relationship between the change in the price of the goods 
and the distance to a LIDL supermarket is radically different between both groups of 
products. On average, prices of products sold by LIDL fell or remained constant near 
the entrant, while in those supermarkets located further away (1,500 meters or more) 
these prices increased.
In addition to showing the average change over all products, we also present the 
relationship of a set of three specific products sold by LIDL. The results are very 
similar. Therefore, for products sold by LIDL prices in the supermarkets near the new 
entrant remained constant or decrease slightly, while in supermarkets further away 
they increased.
For products that LIDL does not sell the relationship is completely different. As 
can be seen from the graphs of Table 2 the average change in their prices is much 
higher near the LIDL supermarkets than in more distant supermarkets. While super-
markets near LIDL significantly increased prices, supermarkets further than 1,500 
meters or more kept prices constant or even reduced them. As in the previous case, it 
also presents the relationship for three products not sold by LIDL that clearly show 
this behavior.
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table 2. Fit Quadratic Equations
Products sold by Lidl Products not sold by Lidl
Average of products Average of products
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
.05
0
–.05
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
.15
.1
.05
0
–.05
–.1
Rice Cornflakes
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
.01
0
–.01
–.02
–.03
–.04
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
.2
.15
.1
.05
0
–.05
Beef Potatoes
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
1.5
1
.5
0
–.5
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
.4
.2
0
–.2
–.4
–.6
Beer Rum
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
.06
.04
.02
0
Distance to Lidl
ln
(P
t=1
/P
t=0
)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
.6
.4
.2
0
Source: Own elaboration.
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This evidence has an intuitive interpretation. González-Benito et al. (2005) 
showed that there is greater competitive pressure from supermarkets that have simi-
lar formats. If we transfer this idea to the type of product rather than the supermarket 
format it seems logical that there is greater competitive pressure among products 
that have the same format, and less or no competitive effect for more distant product 
formats.
However, the correlations showed in the graphical analysis could have other ex-
planations than the entry of LIDL. Therefore, to find a more robust relationship an 
econometric approach is needed.
3. Estimations and main results
As a preliminary analysis we first present some tabulation of the data in the tables 
shown below. First, for each product the price was normalized by the average price 
(over all supermarkets) for the same good prior to entry. The first tabulation shows 
the average price over all goods, classified according to whether the product was 
eventually sold by LIDL or not and whether there is (or, in the case of before the 
entrance, «will be» in this location) a LIDL less than 0.5 kilometers away.
table 3. Price index (normalized) before entry
Is there (will be) a LIDL less than 0.5 kilometers?
No Yes
Is
 (w
ill)
 th
is 
pro
du
ct 
(be
) s
old
 by
 L
ID
L? No 1.008391 0.9562631
Yes 1.005289 0.9715162
Source: Own elaboration.
Thus, for example, on average normalized prices were 1.0083 for products not 
sold by LIDL and in supermarkets further than 0.5 kilometers away before entry. 4 We 
can see from Table 3 that in supermarkets further away from the entrant, prices were 
slightly above average for all products. However, for supermarkets close to the new 
entrant, prices are below average (below 1) prior to entry for both groups of products, 
both those sold and eventually not sold by LIDL.
4 This average is not exactly equal to one because each price was normalized by the price of that 
good for all supermarkets prior to entry. But the weighted average across each row should sum to one, 
where the weights would be the number of supermarkets in each group.
150 Gómez-Lobo, A., Jiménez, J. L., Perdiguero, J.
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 31 (2015) – Páginas 143 a 154
Although this last result lends some support to the idea that prior to entry super-
markets close to entrants lowered all of their prices, we cannot be too emphatic since 
unobserved local demand or cost conditions could also influece the price levels in 
each area. More robust is the comparison between the price tabulation prior to entry 
and the tabulations after entry, which are shown in Table 4 below.
table 4. Price index (normalized) after entry
Is there (will be) a LIDL less than 0.5 kilometers?
No Yes
Is
 (w
ill)
 th
is 
pro
du
ct 
(be
) s
old
 by
 L
ID
L? No 0.9888174 1.02726
Yes 1.033544 1.019316
Source: Own elaboration.
We can see that in supermarkets far away from entrants, prices fell on average by 
almost 2% for products not sold by the entrant (from 1.008 to 0.989). The equivalente 
prices rose for the case of supermarkets close to an entrant, from 0.956 to 1.027, an 
increase of over 7%.
The same did not occur for prices of goods sold by the entrant. In this case, pric-
es rose by almost 3% in supermarkets not close to the entrant and by almost 5% in 
supermarkets close to the entrant. These two figures are not very different or at least 
not as different as the case for products not sold by LIDL.
We can summarize the results of these tabulation as indicating that a) super-
markets close to the new entrants had lower prices for all goods just prior to entry 
compared to supermarkets further away, although this could be due to unobservable 
cost or demand effects, and b) after entry supermarkets close to new entrants raised 
prices on those products not sold by the new entrant. The same price behaviour was 
not observed for these goods in supermarkets further away.
In order to test whether these differences are statistically significant we estimate 
by ordinary least squares the following price change equation:
ln(p1ij) – ln (p0ij) = b0 + b1 ProductnotsoldbyLidli + b2 LidlinXmetersj +
 16 22
+ b3 Prod*Lidlinij + b4 PopulationinXmetersj + Σ bh City + Σ bl Supermsizej + eij
 h=5 l=17
where p1ij is the price of the product i at supermarket j in period 1 and p0ij is the price 
of the product i at supermarket j in period 0. By taking the difference in log prices we 
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are controlling for posible unobserved effects at the local level. Product not sold by 
Lidl is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the product i is not sold by the entrant. 
Lidl in X meters is a variable that counts the number of LIDL stores that supermar-
ket j has in X meters (depending on the specification X can vary from 500 to 1,950 
meters). The variable Prod*Lidlin is the interaction between the two latter variables. 
Population in X meters is the population surrounded supermarket j in a radius of X 
meters (from 500 to 1,950 meters). Finally the variables City and Supermsize are 
fixed effects by geographical and size of supermarket (by square meters of supermar-
ket), respectively.
The idea behind this specification is to compare growth rates of prices in areas 
close to the new LIDL stores (captured by the lidlinXmeters variable) with those 
further away (control group) and depending on whether the product is or is not sold 
by the new entrant. The coefficient on the interaction of these two variables will indi-
cate whether there is a different behaviour of prices of goods sold by the new entrant 
compared to those not sold by the new entrant.
The population, city and supermarket size variables are included to control for 
any cost shock or behavioral heterogeneity that may have affected different zones 
and store types.
Alternatively, we could have specified a difference in difference model for each 
product separately. This can be done by estimating an equation for the price level (or 
log prices) of each good in each supermarket on a time dummy indicating whether 
the observation was for a price before or after the entry of LIDL, whether the obser-
vation was taken in a supermarket close to the area where a LIDL store opened, and 
the interaction of these two variables. Then we could have compared the parameter 
value of this interaction term for each product and see whether they differ on average 
between products sold by LIDL and products not sold by the new entrant.
However, our specification has several advantages. First, not all products are sold 
by each supermarket and estimating a product by product equation results in poor 
estimates due to the small number of observations for some goods. Second, our spec-
ification allows us to directly identify the different effects of LIDL entry on products 
sold and not sold by the new entrant without having to do a complementary analysis 
of results.
The results of estimating the model are presented in Table 5. It shows that the 
interaction parameter is positive and statistically significant when X is equal to and 
greater than 500 meters and smaller than 1,500 meters. This coefficient indicates that 
for those products not sold by LIDL the growth in prices was larger for supermarkets 
with an entrant closeby compared to supermarkets further away. Furthermore, this 
effect decreases as we consider supermarkets further away from the new entrants. 
Past 1,500 meters there is no further discernible effect.
These results indicate that supermarkest close to a new entrant increased prices 
significantly on those products not sold by LIDL after entry, while similar supermar-
kets further away did not increase the prices on these goods. We interpret these results 
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as confirming our prior expectations that supermarkets close to new entrants may 
have reacted to the entry announcement by lowering prices on all goods and then, 
once entry occurs they raise prices on the goods that the new entrant does not sell. 
This effect would not be present for the same goods in supermarkets further away.
table 5. Estimation of change in prices ln(p1ij /p0ij)
Distance 
(meters)
Product not sold 
by LIDL
LIDL near 
in X meters Interaction Constant
500 0.043 (0.012)*** –0.031 (0.045) 0.125 (0.062)** –0.033
750 0.037 (0.013)** 0.015 (0.031) 0.126 (0.043)** –0.033
1,000 0.039 (0.013)** 0.008 (0.031) 0.086 (0.041)** –0.035
1,250 0.039 (0.013)** –0.011 (0.027) 0.059 (0.036)** –0.035
1,500 0.039 (0.013)** –0.003 (0.026) 0.056 (0.034)* –0.039
1,750 0.042 (0.014)** –0.008 (0.027) 0.036 (0.033) –0.034
1,950 0.043 (0.014)** –0.009 (0.026) 0.032 (0.033) –0.034
Number 
observations 2,631 R
2
 (Average) 0.019
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance test. Standard errors in brackets.
Note 2: All estimations include population, size of supermarket and fixed effects by city, which are not included in this 
table.
Note 3: All estimations are jointly significant.
4. Conclusions
The results of this paper are not consistent with the existing literature. We find 
that after entry by LIDL in the Gran Canaria supermarket industry prices actually 
rose in the incumbent stores close to the new entrants compared to a suitable control 
group further away. However this increase occurred mostly for products not sold by 
the new entrant. How do we explain this pricing behavior?
One possible explanation is that the effect of entry may be incorporated into 
prices when entry is (credibly) announced and much earlier than when actual entry 
occurs. This is consistent with similar findings in other countries (Lira et al., 2007). 
It is also consistent with the finding in this paper that indicates that prices for goods 
just prior to entry were initially lower in supermarkets close to the future entrant 
compared to supermarkets further away for all goods. Unfortunately, since we do not 
have prices prior to the entry announcement and because there may be unobserved 
local effects that explain price differences between entry and no entry areas, we can-
not test this proposition. However, if confirmed by future research, this hypothesis 
implies that care must be taken by researchers when trying to estimate the effects of 
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entry on incumbent’s prices. It will make a difference whether benchmark prices are 
registered before entry is announced or during the interim period between announce-
ment and actual entry.
The empirical analysis undertaken in this paper also shows that incumbents’ pric-
es rose by close to 9% after entry in areas close to the new entrants. However, only for 
the goods eventually not sold by the entrant. The same did not occur for goods sold 
by the entrant. In this case, price increased by a similar amount in supermarkets close 
to the entrant compared to supermarkets further away. What can explain this result?
Following the hypothesis presented above, it would seem that incumbent super-
markets lowered prices on all goods close to the new entrant. Perhaps this was a 
consequence of the uncertainty as to the format that the new entrant would have and 
thus the product range that it would offer. Subsequently, once they observed the prod-
ucts sold by the entrant, the incumbents close to the new entrants raised prices on the 
goods where they did not face competition.
It would imply that incumbent prices do react to entry near their stores. In turn 
this would confirm that entry barriers that may hinder entry in this industry may 
be causing harm to consumers. Particularly suspect are regulations, such as those 
currently in effect in Spain, which places a limit on the total floor area or number of 
competitors according to population or other demographic parameters in each local 
market. The evidence presented in this paper also suggests that 1.5 kilometers seems 
to be a reasonable cut-off point to define the caption area around a supermarket.
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